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Abstract This presentation describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-
based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform
and assist analysts in the following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and
safety/hazard models; 2) combine the parts with library information to develop the models for
visualization and analysis; 3) perform graph analysis and simulation to identify and evaluate
possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and functions, in nominal and
anomalous system-software configurations and scenarios; and 4) identify resulting candidate
scenarios for software integration testing. There has been significant technical progress in
model extraction from Orion program text sources, architecture model derivation (components
and connections) and documentation of extraction sources. Models have been derived from
Internal Interface Requirements Documents (IIRDs) and FMEA documents. Linguistic text
processing is used to extract model parts and relationships, and the Aerospace Ontology also
aids automated model development from the extracted information. Visualizations of these
models assist analysts in requirements overview and in checking consistency and
completeness.
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Software Assurance Symposium 2009
• NASA needs early evaluation of software-system
integration risks and constraints
– Assess system faults, failures and hazards that may
challenge software in system integration testing
– Identify robustness and safety issues early
– Identify requirements gaps early
• Process of reviewing various large and
uncoordinated source documents is difficult
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Approach and Relevance
• Semi-automated modeling for Safety Analysis
and to identify cases for Integration Testing:
Documents 4 Extract Text 4 Construct Model and
Visualization 4 Analyze Hazard Paths and Simulate
– Focus on system integration, interfaces, failures and
hazards, which cause most of aerospace software
(requirements) defects
– Focus on information from Preliminary Design
Review (PDR) – benefit of early analysis is greatest
• Two Constellation Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) cases
– Launch Abort System (LAS) pyrotechnics and Crew Module
(CM)
– Service Model (SM) propulsion
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Summary of Products
• Models constructed from information
extracted from text documents
• Visualizations for insight into information
scattered in large documents
• Component model templates
• Output for model reuse
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Latest Results
• Model Information Extraction from Text
–Variety of types of documents analyzed
– Variety of information types extracted
• Model Construction
– Component-Connection Models and
Visualizations
–Model templates for path analysis
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^	 Overview of Method and Tools
• Develop system connection model and visualization
– Acquire PDR-level documents
• Interface requirements, failure modes and effects analyses,
hazard reports
– Automatically extract needed model information
• Document analysis and linguistic analysis
– Semi-automatically construct model, visualization and
traceability information
• Nomenclature ontology and component templates library
• Export the information for reuse
• Perform path analysis and simulation to analyze
potential hazard paths
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FMEA/CIL Worksheet for Thruster Mounting Structure
SM
Thruster
Mounting
Structure
Thrusters
Source Documents and Cases
• Documents
– Failure Mode and
Effects
Analysis/Critical
Items List
(FMEA/CIL)
– Internal Interface
Requirements
Document (IIRD)
– Hazard Reports
• Challenges
– Variety of Formats
– Document Maturity
– Quality of the data
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Semantic Text Analysis Tool (STAT) Extractions
• System to subcomponent indentured hierarchy
– From FMEA/CIL document front matter section organization
– From FMEA/CIL worksheet hierarchy: System/Element, Module, Subsystem,
Sub-Subsystem
– From FMEA/CIL worksheet failure modes and cause description: Item
subcomponents
– From Hazard Report cause descriptions and cause controls
• Components, connections and connection content
– From IIRDs: Provide and receive statements
– From FMEA/CIL worksheet Item function description: Provide, receive, transfer
statements
– From sensor names, e.g., “Flange Temperature Sensor”
• Function, failure and phase Information
– From IIRDs: Item vulnerabilities and limits, operational context
– From FMEA/CIL worksheet: item functions/actions, failure mode description,
cause description, mission phase
– From Hazard Report causes descriptions and cause controls
• Acronyms
• Traceability Information: Source document and source texts
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Linguistic Extraction Progress
• Approach: Parse words and phrases in document text
– Specify relevant sections and fields for analysis, using document
structure grammar
– After linguistic analysis, use Aerospace Ontology nomenclature to
identify phrases that indicate problems and verbs that indicate
• Actions/Functions
• Connecting relationships – e.g., sends, supplies, transfers, distributes, carries
• Part-of or other structural relationships – contains, consists of, comprises
– XML-formatted output of relevant model information
• Progress
– Extraction from multiple document data structures and mime types
• General format specification approach
– Better linguistic analysis for information extraction
• Integrated advanced parser from University of Central Florida
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Attitude Control Motor (ACM) 	 Abort Motor (AM)	 Jettison Motor (JM)
Safe & Arm Components	 Manifolds	 ACM Controllers
•	 Numbered multiple instances of components
	
TBI – Through Bulkhead Initiator
•	 Pop-ups on components and connections, with 	 NSI –NASA Standard Initiator
model information and traceability
	
FCDC –Flexible Confined Detonating Cord (a network)
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From LAS Case to CEV SM
• Generalized to another Orion case:
Service Module (SM) Propulsion
– PDR data book had updated FMEA/CILs
and Hazard Reports for extraction
– Documents for other subsystems were
generally less complete and less mature
• Identified and met new challenges
–New FMEA/CIL worksheet format, Hazard
Report format, new text styles
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SM Auxiliary Engine Model Visualization (Partial)
RTD - Resistive Temperature Device
SM Reaction Control System (RCS)
Model Visualization (Partial)
SM Propulsion Case Results
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• Hazard Identification Tool (HIT) automatically
processes extracted XML
– Uses component hierarchy to define model hierarchy and
inner models
– Generates component-connection models, using ontology to
identify types of components, connections and flows on
connections
– Associates with components and connections: functions,
hazards, failures and traceability information
• Visualization for Safety personnel
• XML output for model information reuse
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• Top-Level Model from IIRD Document
LAS
• Text extraction and screening against the ontology
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Source text: The CM shall receive health and status data from the LAS in
accordance with TBD-LASCM-
0037.	 Text anal
IF.CM.LAS.0066	 previous
A connection from the LAS to the CM
on
Pop-up Documentation for Connections
• Box pops up when
user clicks on
connection arrow
• Information
• Document Title
• Requirement
number
• Type of thing sent
: Info/Signal
• Source Text
• Multiple interface
requirements
describe this
connection
• Provide version
• Receive version
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Pop-up Documentation for Component
• Box pops up when user
clicks on component
• Information
– FMEA Document Title and
FMEA worksheet number
– Item Name: ..Sensor...
– Item Function: Senses ...
temperature and
provides output to the
vehicle interface
– Failure Modes: Loss of
Thermal Contact...
– Causes for each failure
mode Component: temperature sensor for a flange
– Sub-component: Fastener
ISAS_09_Technical_Malin_Automated_Tool_for_System_Safety_Analysis
	 16
• Evaluation session with K. Chen, responsible for Orion avionics
safety
• Positive Reactions to Visualization
– Helps analyst look for missing information in the documents in an
organized and efficient way
– Helps analyst check if hazard path is correct and whether fulfills
requirements
– Combining extractions from IIRDs, FMEAs and detailed Hazard
Analyses can help build a complete picture and identify
missing and inconsistent information
• Identify things appearing in the FMEA but not Hazard Analysis
and vice versa
• Looks forward to taking this combined information to his safety
engineer and the Orion contractor
– References to source documents are helpful
– This tool should interest NASA headquarters.
• K. Chen has provided detailed LAS System Hazard Reports for
model extraction to get the combined picture
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From FMEA to Hazard Analysis
• Extraction from Hazard Report text for the Hazard
Identification Tool (HIT) models and visualizations
• Extractions from Orion Hazard Report: “Failure to
Fire Electrically Controlled Pyrotechnics results in
Loss of Crew/Loss of Mission”
– Cause B: Avionics/Electrical Failure
– Cause B description example (4 causes are listed)
• “A failure in the Test Port Flight Cap prevents power or
redirects power through a short circuit causing no power to
reach the NSI.”
– Cause B controls example
• “RIU Test Port Flight Cap is designed to prevent shorts of one
or more firing lines.”
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– Extraction from Cause Description and Cause controls
– Components, sub-components, connections, entity in
Path
• “RIU Test Port Flight Cap, NSI, firing lines, power”
• Others: “EPS, MBSU, PEC power supply, PEC firing circuits,
PEC capacitor banks, Flight Plug”
– Faults and failures
• “RIU Test Port Flight Cap failure”
• “Short circuit, short” (or sneak circuit, fail open, race condition)
• “Prevents power, redirects power” (or not deliver energy)
• “No power reaches NSI”
• Others: “fails to command”
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• XML file output of model information
and traceability for use in other tools
– Components, connections, and other
model properties
• XML output function uses an easily
changed specification
–Accommodates changes in the model
structure or output properties
• XML output for LAS pyrotechnics model
delivered to Triakis
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Virtual System Integration Lab (VSIL)
LAS Mode
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LAS Pyro Nominal Test Results
Test 1: LAS Pyro Safe/Flight Plug Tests
Step 1a. Verify Safe/Flight Plug Initial State == SAFE
Initial Plug A Status == SAFE: +++ PASS +++
Initial Plug B Status == SAFE: +++ PASS +++
Step 1b. Verify Safe/Flight Plug output voltage <= 1.0
Plug A output voltage == 0.187484 : +++ PASS +++
Plug B output voltage == 0.187484 : +++ PASS +++
Step 1c. Change Safe/Flight Plug State to FLIGHT
New Plug A State == FLIGHT: +++ PASS +++
New Plug B State == FLIGHT: +++ PASS +++
Step 1d. Verify Safe/Flight Plug output voltage >= 24.0
Plug A output voltage == 27.996068 : +++ PASS +++
Plug B output voltage == 27.996068 : +++ PASS +++
Step 1e. Change Safe/Flight Plug State to SAFE
New Plug A Status == SAFE: +++ PASS +++
New Plug B Status == SAFE: +++ PASS +++
Step 1f. Verify Safe/Flight Plug output voltage <= 1.0
Plug A output voltage == 0.205305 : +++ PASS +++
Plug B output voltage == 0.205305 : +++ PASS +++
Test 1 Final Result: +++ PASSED +++
Test 2: LAS Safe/Arm Valve Tests
Step 2a. Verify Safe/Arm Valve Initial State == SAFE
Abort Motor Valve Status == SAFE: +++ PASS +++
Jettison Motor Valve Status == SAFE: +++ PASS +++
Step 2b. Setting : Command SA Valves to ARMED State
Abort Motor Valve Status == ARMED: +++ PASS +++
Jettison Motor Valve Status == ARMED: +++ PASS +++
Test 2 Final Result: +++ PASSED +++
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HIT Models for Path Analysis
• Hazard Identification Tool models are being
enhanced for HIT-path analysis of LAS pyrotechnics
paths and dependencies
– Component mode transitions that are actions with enabling
or disabling conditions (e.g., energy, power, percussion)
• Most LAS operations of concern are mode transitions rather
than continuous actions occurring within operating modes
– Variable properties for entities transferred across connection
paths (e.g., command signal values)
• A simplified LAS pyrotechnics model was constructed
to test these new capabilities
– Templates for Pyrotechnic Devices, Pyro Event Controllers,
Initiators, Power Supplies, Safe and Arm Devices
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SMA
Model Reuse Study
Requirements Level Documents	 Ontology Terms
STAT
Grammar based
model
Visualized Model
HIT-model
	 Component	 Ontology/
Templates	 Library
Model
System FSM	 Procedure HIT-path
model	 V&V FSM
Hazard Scenarios Test Cases
Virtual Sim	 VSIL 14	
Config
Report
FFA
TEAMS
Report
Time-based Discrete Sim
Report for Hazard Scenarios
Model output for:
• Virtual System
Integration Lab
(VS IL)
•	 Finite State
Machines (FSMs)
•	 Functional Fault
Models for
Testability
Engineering and
Maintenance
System (TEAMS)
SAS_09_Technical_Malin_Automated_Tool_for_System_Safety_Analysis	 24
• Component hierarchy and component-
connection architecture
– System modes
– Configurations and phases
• Functions and actions of components
• Component modes/states and transitions
– Operating and failure modes
– State transitions and triggers
• Faults and hazards
– Disabled functions, actions and transitions
• Instrumentation and key value constraints
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Findings/Recommendations
• Visualization can help SMA personnel
– Overview and drill down to review large documents
• Most useful documents are IIRDs, FMEAs, Hazard
Reports at PDR
– Pre-PDR documents are not mature enough
– Extraction from requirements, structured text descriptions,
structured worksheets and tables
• PowerPoint charts and schematics are not promising
formats for extraction
• Standard requirements formats for model generation
could help both authors and modelers
• Model extractions can be reused for FSMs and
TEAMS models
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Planned Capability
• Situations where these tools can be applied
– Automatic extraction of Information for model development
in aerospace programs and projects (Orion, Altair & others)
• System components connections, interfaces, dependencies
• Functions, actions, failures and hazards
• Modes and states and transitions
• Auxiliary information such as source text and traceability
information
– Development of low-fidelity early (PDR) models of systems
interacting with software and controls
– Development of visualizations for safety analysis
– Analysis/simulation of system dependencies and paths of
failure causes, effects and hazards
• Identify scenarios for integration tests
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• Technical Solutions
– Improved extraction from structured text in more types of
documents and document sections
– More automation of construction of models and visualizations
from extracted information
– Specification files to handle changes in extraction, model
construction, and XML model output
• Improvements needed for wider use
– Support for updating specification files
– More support for manual interaction in model construction,
review and expansion
– Library of model templates for types of components
• Methods for mapping model information to templates
– Support for systematic path analysis
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